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ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION IN
ADMINISTERING THE DEATH PENALTY: THE
NEED FOR THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT
Erwin Chemerinsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
What if 65% of the applicants for positions in a govern-
ment office were African-American, but 80% of those hired
were white?' A black applicant certainly could bring a suit
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act2 and force the
employer to show that race was not a factor in the hiring
decisions.
What if the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
strike prospective jurors who were black four times more
than to exclude those who were white? Under Batson v. Ken-
tucky,3 it is clear that the defense could require the prosecu-
tor to demonstrate that the peremptory challenges were not
exercised based on race.
What if more than 60% of murder cases involved African-
American victims, but in cases where the death penalty is
sought more than 80% involved white victims? What if an
African-American who kills a white victim is more than five
times as likely to be given the death penalty than a white
who kills a white? What if an African-American who kills a
white is 60 times more likely to be sentenced to death than an
African-American who kills an African-American? Does the
law require that this racial disparity be explained on non-ra-
cial grounds? It should, but as of now, it clearly does not.
* Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law
Center. I would like to thank Jill Franklin and Andrea Pott for their excellent
research assistance.
1. The analogy is drawn from an article written by two former United
States Attorneys General, Elliot L. Richardson and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.
Elliot L. Richardson and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Base Death Sentences on
the Facts, Not Race, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, June 13, 1993, at 19.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, 16 (1964).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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In almost every important area-employment, housing,
public benefits, peremptory challenges-proof of racially dis-
parate impact can be used to require the government to prove
a non-racial explanation for its actions.4 Not, however, with
regard to the one area where the government determines who
lives and who dies.
This is what the Racial Justice Act8 would have done;
proof of significant racial discrimination in the administra-
tion of the death penalty would have required the prosecutor
to show a non-race based explanation for a death sentence.6
The Racial Justice Act was passed by the House of Represent-
atives in 1994 as part of the Crime Bill.7 Unfortunately, the
threat of a Republican filibuster in the Senate caused it to be
deleted in Conference Committee from the final version of the
law."
In this essay, I make three points. First, the death pen-
alty is administered in a racially discriminatory manner.
Second, current law is inadequate to deal with this problem.
Third, the Racial Justice Act would be a desirable solution.
My focus is not on whether there should be a death pen-
alty. Realistically, the death penalty is going to remain a
part of American law for the foreseeable future. My central
argument is that it is imperative that steps be taken to en-
sure that capital punishment is administered in a racially
neutral fashion. Who lives and who dies, who gets sentenced
to death and who to life imprisonment, should not be a func-
tion of the race of the defendant or the race of the victim.
Since I delivered these remarks at the symposium in Oc-
tober, the Republicans have taken control of both the House
of Representatives and the Senate. This, of course, makes
enactment of the Racial Justice Act even less likely. It does
not, however, make it less necessary or less right. Also,
states that have the death penalty can adopt their own ver-
sions of such a law.
4. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
5. H.R. 4017, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
6. Id.
7. H.R. 3355, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
8. Anti-Crime Legislation, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 19, 1994, at 6.
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II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES IS
ADMINISTERED IN RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
MANNER
Understanding the role of race in capital punishment de-
cision-making requires a broader sense of the racism that
pervades the American justice system. Statistics clearly
show that the criminal justice system treats African-Ameri-
cans worse than Caucasians at every step of the process. 9
In contacts with the police, blacks are much more likely
to be subjected to abuse than are whites. 10 It was not a coin-
cidence that Rodney King was black and his assailants were
four white police officers. In one study, focusing on Memphis,
Tennessee, it was shown that blacks were ten times more
likely than whites to have been shot at by police officers,
eighteen times more likely to have been wounded, and five
times more likely to have been killed.11
When prosecutors make decisions concerning bail recom-
mendations and charging, blacks again are treated much
worse than whites arrested for similar offenses and with com-
parable records.' 2 A task force in Minnesota found that over
a three year period, whites with prior criminal records were
released without bail more often than minorities without a
criminal record. 13 Study after study has documented that
prosecutorial charging decisions are very much influenced by
the race of the accused perpetrator and the race of the
victim.' 4
At the sentencing stage as well, blacks are likely to re-
ceive much higher sentences for similar crimes than whites
with comparable criminal records. 15 On average, sentences
9. See infra notes 10-17.
10. James J. Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J. OF
CRIMINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 707, 718-20 (1982).
11. Id.
12. See generally, Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process:
I-IX, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1472-641 (1988).
13. Erwin Chemerinsky, Underlying Causes of Injustice, L.A. DAILY J., Nov.
16, 1993, at 4.
14. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process: IV.
Race and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1520 (1988);
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in
Homicide Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'y REV. 587, 615-19 (1985).
15. Joan Petersilia, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System
(Rand Corp., 1983)(documenting that African-Americans serve longer sentences
from comparable offenses than do whites).
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for blacks are ten percent greater than those imposed on
whites. 16 A study by the National Sentencing Commission
found that blacks are receive an average sentence of 68.5
months under the federal sentencing guidelines compared to
an average sentence of about 44.7 months for whites.17 State
laws and federal guidelines, of course, are written in race-
neutral language; but discretion in sentencing inevitably ex-
ists and provides the opportunity for racial discrimination.
In this context, it is not surprising that race matters
greatly in decisions concerning the death penalty. The most
famous study was conducted by law professor David Baldus
who examined the imposition of the death penalty in Geor-
gia.I The Baldus study found that the prosecutor sought the
death penalty in 70% of cases involving a black defendant
and a white victim; 15% of cases involving a black defendant
and a black victim; and 19% of cases involving a white de-
fendant and a black victim. 19
Many other studies confirm this discriminatory pattern
in capital decision-making. In Alabama, where the popula-
tion is 24% black, 43% of the 117 inmates on death row are
black.2 ° In Philadelphia, where the population is 19% black,
a single judge is responsible for sentencing 26 people to
death, 92% of whom were black.2 '
A nationwide study by the Dallas Times Herald of 11,425
capital murders from 1977 to 1984 revealed that a killer of a
white is nearly three times more likely to be sentenced to
death than a killer of a black.22 A study by Samuel Gross
and Robert Mauro of capital sentencing in eight states found
that race was a key factor in death penalty decision-mak-
ing.2 3 For example, the study found that defendants in Flor-
16. Samuel L. Myers, Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Re-
forms Reduce Discrimination in Punishment, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 793
(1993).
17. Charles Ogletree, Does Race Matter in Criminal Prosecutions, THE
CHAMPION, July 1991, at 13.
18. David Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Em.
pirieal Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 709-
10 (1983).
19. Id. at 707-12.
20. H.R. REP. ON H.R. 4017, THE RACIAL JUSTICE AcT (1994).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, DEATH ANi) DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 35-94 (1989).
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ida convicted of killing whites were eight times more likely to
receive the death penalty than those convicted of murdering
blacks.24 In Georgia, where 63.5% of homicide victims were
black, those who killed whites were ten times more likely to
receive a death sentence than defendants with black
victims. 25
Similar evidence is emerging under the limited federal
death penalty adopted in 198826 for so-called "drug kingpins."
Of 36 defendants against whom a federal death penalty has
been sought, four defendants were white, four were His-
panic, and 28 were black. All ten defendants approved thus
far for capital prosecution by Attorney General Janet Reno
have been black.28
The overall statistics from across the country paint a
stark and unequivocal picture. Of the 236 people executed in
this country since 1976, over 80% of the cases involved a
white victim while nearly 50% of the homicide victims each
year are nonwhite. 29 A 1990 report by the General Account-
ing Office reviewed 28 different studies and found that they
clearly documented a pattern "indicating racial disparities in
the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death
penalty."30
What explains these statistics? Surely, virtually all of
the participants in the criminal justice system would deny
that they are racists. Yet, unconscious racism exists at every
step along the way in the criminal justice system. 31 As docu-
mented above, prosecutors are more likely to charge blacks
with first degree murder than whites for comparable
crimes.32 Blacks are less likely to be successfiil in negotiating
a plea bargain that would reduce the charge or the sen-
24. Id. at 44.
25. Id. at 43-44.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1988).
27. H. R. REP. ON H.R. 4017, supra note 20.
28. Lori Montgomery, After Three Decades, U.S. Returning to Death Row, 6
Men Await Federal Execution, MLkMI HERALD, April 11, 1994, at Al.
29. Elliot Richardson & Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Base Death Sentences
on the Facts, Not Race, CmusTAN Sc. MONITOR, June 13, 1994, at 19.
30. Carol Moseley-Braun, Racial Justice and the Death Penalty, WASH.
PosT, May 28, 1994, at A27.
31. For an excellent discussion of unconscious racism in the legal system see
Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
32. See supra notes 12-14, 30-31 and accompanying text.
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tence.3 3 Prosecutors are more likely to seek the death pen-
alty against blacks than against whites.1
4
Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court has em-
phasized that juries must have discretion in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty,35 and this discretion
provides the opportunity for the manifestation of racism. The
Court has recognized that in a capital sentencing proceeding,
the jury is called upon to make "a highly subjective, 'unique
individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a
particular person deserves.' "36 For example, the Court has
held that every capital jury must be free to weigh relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors before deciding whether
to impose the death penalty. 7
The Supreme Court, itself, has recognized that this dis-
cretion provides the opportunity for race to infect decision-
making in capital cases. In Turner v. Murray, upon review-
ing a case where the trial judge refused to question prospec-
tive jurors about race bias during voir dire, the Court stated:
"Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a
capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for
racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected."38 Juries
subconsciously may be less likely to sympathize with black
defendants and more likely to fear them. Likewise, juries
may be more likely to feel the need for retribution when the
victim of a crime is white than when the victim is black.
The overall result is that the most fundamental decisions
that a society can make-who shall live and who shall die-
are racially biased. Controlling for all other variables, the
differences shown in the studies are explainable only by the
race of the defendant and the race of the victim.
III. CURRENT LAW FAILS TO PROVIDE A REMEDY FOR THE
RACIST ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The Supreme Court has held that proof of disparate im-
pact is generally insufficient to demonstrate a denial of equal
33. See supra notes 12-14, 30-31 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 12-14, 30-31 and accompanying text.
35. See Lawrence, supra note 31.
36. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985) (citing Zant v. Ste-
phens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
37. E.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 597-609 (1978) (plurality opinion).
38. 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
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protection. 39 If a law is facially race neutral, proving a viola-
tion of equal protection requires showing a discriminatory
purpose for the government's action.40 Under federal anti-
discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act Amendments which prohibits employment dis-
crimination4 1 or the 1982 Voting Rights Act which prohibits
discriminatory voting arrangements,42 disparate impact is
sufficient. But under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that there must be proof of a discrimi-
natory purpose.43
There are many ways of demonstrating impermissible in-
tent. In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Cor-
poration,44 the Supreme Court expressly recognized that a
statistical pattern so stark as to leave no other explanation
but racial discrimination would suffice to prove an equal pro-
tection violation.45 In fact, in the seminal case of Washington
v. Davis,46 which had created the requirement for proof of dis-
criminatory purpose in equal protection cases, Justice Ste-
vens in a concurring opinion recognized that "[fIrequently the
most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of
what actually happened rather than evidence describing the
subjective state of mind of the actor."47
This is certainly not a new or novel proposition. The
Court has recognized the role of statistical proof in demon-
strating equal protection violations both before and after
Washington v. Davis. For instance, in 1973, in Mayor of Phil-
adelphia v. Educational Equality League,48 the Court flatly
declared: "Statistical analyses have served and will continue
39. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976)(holding that
proof of discriminatory impact of a test in hiring police officers was insufficient
to demonstrate a denial of equal protection); see also Personnel Adminstrator v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-81 (1977)(holding that discriminatory impact against
women because of a state law giving benefits to veterans in hiring for state jobs
was not a violation of equal protection due to the absence of proof of a discrimi-
natory purpose).
40. Washington, 426 U.S. at 241-47.
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. TV 1993).
42. Voting Rights Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
43. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-47 (1976); see also Person-
nel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979).
44. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
45. Id. at 266.
46. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
47. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
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to serve an important role as one indirect indicator of racial
discrimination."49 More recently, in cases such as Bazemore
v. Friday,5 ° in 1986, the Court upheld the use of statistical
evidence to prove discriminatory purpose and an equal pro-
tection violation by the North Carolina Agricultural Exten-
sion Service in setting salaries for black and white
employees. 1
Therefore, in light of the statistics proving racism in the
administration of the death penalty, it was to be expected
that the Supreme Court would be asked to find that there is a
denial of equal protection if the defendant can show a statisti-
cal pattern so stark as to leave no other explanation than
that the death penalty was administered in a racially dis-
criminatory manner. However, in McCleskey v. Kemp,52 the
Supreme Court, by a five to four decision, held that statistics
are insufficient to prove race discrimination in death penalty
sentencing. 53 Justice Powell authored the opinion for the
Court and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, O'Connor, and Scalia.54 Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.55
The defendant, Warren McCleskey, was an African-
American sentenced to death for murder in Georgia.56 In his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that
Georgia administered its capital sentencing process in a ra-
cially discriminatory manner and, thus, violated both the
Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 57 At the heart of his claim was a
statistical study, mentioned above, that was conducted by
Professor David Baldus. 8 The study examined over 2,000
homicide cases in Georgia and controlled for 230 non-racial
factors. 59 The results showed that a person accused of mur-
dering a white individual was 4.3 times more likely to be sen-
49. Id. at 620.
50. 474 U.S. 1080 (1986).
51. Id. For the underlying facts see Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662 (4th
Cir. 1984).
52. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
53. Id. at 306, 313.
54. Id. at 282.
55. Id. at 320.
56. Id. at 283.
57. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 286-87.
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tenced to death than a person accused of murdering a black
individual.6 °
The Court rejected this claim and the use of statistical
proof to demonstrate an equal protection violation in capital
cases. 6 1 The Court explained that there was no evidence that
decision-makers had used race as the basis for their deci-
sion.62 There was no proof that the Georgia legislature had a
racist purpose in adopting the laws authorizing capital pun-
ishment.63 Nor was there proof that the jury sentencing Mc-
Cleskey used race as the basis for its sentencing decision. 64
The Court explained that the Baldus study at most proved a
correlation between race and capital sentencing; the study
did not prove that race was actually the basis for the jury's
decision.6 5 The Court emphasized that there are many
checks against the manifestation of racism in capital cases,
including limits on prosecutorial bias in charging decisions
and aggressive questioning of prospective jurors during voir
dire about their racial sentiments.6 6
The Court concluded its opinion by expressing concern
that if McCleskey's argument was accepted, the judiciary
would be confronted with similar challenges to other penal-
ties.67 The Court refused to open the courthouse doors to
such challenges based on disproportionate impact in
sentencing. 8
In other words, despite the stark statistical pattern and a
study that controlled for every other variable, the Court still
was unwilling to find that the data proved racial discrimina-
tion in capital decision-making. 9 Interestingly, last year, a
memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to the other Jus-
tices was made public which reveals that Scalia accepted
that the statistics proved discrimination .7 0 After Justice
60. Id. at 287.
61. Id. at 299.
62. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93, 297 (1987).
63. Id. at 298-99.
64. Id. at 297, 310-11.
65. Id. at 312.
66. Id. at 313.
67. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987).
68. Id. at 315-19.
69. Id. at 297.
70. This memorandum is discussed in Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the
Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Perspective of Justice
Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 14 MERCER L. REV. 999 (1994).
1995] 527
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Thurgood Marshall's death, his papers were made public by
the Library of Congress. Amidst them was a memo written
by Scalia in the McCleskey case. The memo is only a para-
graph long and worth quoting in its entirety. The memoran-
dum was dated January 6, 1987; it states:
Re: No. 84-6811-McCleskey v. Kemp
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: I plan to join
Lewis's opinion in this case, with two reservations. I disa-
gree with the argument that the inferences that can be
drawn from the Baldus study are weakened by the fact
that each jury and each trial is unique, or by the large
number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view,
implicit in the opinion, that an effect of racial factors upon
sentencing, if it could only be shown by sufficiently strong
statistical evidence, would require reversal. Since it is my
view that unconscious operation of irrational sympathies
and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and
(hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in
the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot hon-
estly say that all I need is more proof. I expect to write
separately to make these points, but not until I see the
dissent.7
The memorandum was signed, in hand, "Nino".72
The implications of this memorandum are enormous.
The memo clearly states that Scalia believes that the Baldus
study successfully proves racial discrimination in the admin-
istration of the death penalty. Indeed, Justice Scalia ex-
pressly recognizes that unconscious racism infects the capital
sentencing process. But he nonetheless concludes that there
is not a denial of equal protection even though statistics
prove racism and even though he believes that the process is
inherently racist. Justice Scalia stated that, no matter what
the statistical proof, he would not find a denial of equal
protection.
This means that in McCleskey, five of the Justices-the
four dissenting Justices and Justice Scalia-believed that
McCleskey successfully proved racial bias in the imposition of
the death penalty. Nonetheless, McCleskey's sentence was
affirmed and ultimately he was executed.73
71. Memorandum on file with the Santa Clara Law Review.
72. Signature representing Justice Antonin Scalia.
73. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987).
528 [Vol. 35
DEATH PENALTY SYMPOSIUM
After McCleskey, statistical proof of racially disparate
impact is not enough even to shift the burden of proof to the
prosecutor to offer a non-race based explanation. A defend-
ant could only challenge a death sentence as a denial of equal
protection if there was specific evidence that the jury in his or
her case consciously used race as a basis for its decision-mak-
ing. Because racism is often unconscious, or usually, at the
least, not openly expressed, such proof will rarely be
available.
In fact, cases since McCleskey indicate that death
sentences are upheld even when there is other evidence of ra-
cism. Consider a few examples. In one Florida case, the trial
judge on the record referred to the parents of the black de-
fendant in a capital case as "niggers."74 The Florida Supreme
Court upheld the death sentence and rejected the argument
that there was sufficient proof of impermissible bias by the
trial court.75
In a Georgia case that involved a black man sentenced to
death for killing a white victim, the trial judge referred to the
defendant, a grown man, as a "colored boy."76 Additionally,
after the trial, two of the jurors admitted that during deliber-
ations they used the slur, "nigger," and two jurors said that
they found blacks to be scarier than whites. 77 Nonetheless,
the federal court rejected a habeas corpus petition and found
the death sentence to be constitutional.78
After McCleskey, it will be extremely difficult to success-
fully challenge a death sentence on equal protection grounds.
Even though a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court
have recognized that racism seriously infects the capital pro-
cess, current law simply fails to provide any remedy.
IV. THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT AS A SOLUTION
In September 1994, President Clinton signed into law an
omnibus crime bill.7 9 Absent from the bill was a provision
known as the Racial Justice Act. The Racial Justice Act was
introduced as H.R. 4017 and would have amended Title 28 of
74. Peek v. Florida, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986).
75. Id. at 55.
76. Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
77. Id. at 1576-78.
78. Id. at 1579-81.
79. H.R. 3355, supra note 7.
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the United States Code by adding Chapter 177, entitled "Ra-
cially Discriminatory Capital Sentencing."80 The bill passed
the House of Representatives, but there was a threat of a Re-
publican filibuster in the Senate if the crime bill included
such a provision.81 In an effort to secure approval of the
crime bill, in July 1994, the White House supported its re-
moval from the bill.8 2
The Racial Justice Act has one purpose: to allow the use
of statistics as evidence of racial bias in the imposition of the
death sentence in a particular case.83 The Act specifically
seeks to overturn effects of McCleskey which, as described
above, has the effect that statistical evidence of bias no mat-
ter how comprehensive and compelling, cannot be used in
death penalty cases to prove a constitutional violation. 4
The Racial Justice Act does not prohibit the death pen-
alty. Rather, it provides that no person shall be put to death
under federal or state law if the sentence was imposed be-
cause of the race of the defendant or the victim.8 5 A defend-
ant challenging a death sentence as racist would be required
to prove a pattern of racially discriminatory death sentences
in the relevant jurisdiction. 6 The Act requires the showing
of bias in the particular sentence being challenged. 7 It
would not be enough to show that blacks get the death pen-
alty significantly more frequently than whites for the same
type of offense.88 Any statistical analysis would need to com-
pare cases similar in level of aggravation to the case being
challenged. 9
The Act provides that the court must independently eval-
uate the validity of the evidence presented to establish the
inference of racial discrimination and must determine if it is
sufficient to provide a basis for the inference. 90 The defend-
ant must make a statistically significant showing of discrimi-
nation that takes into account the relevant non-racial aggra-
80. House Report on H.R. 4017, supra note 20.
81. THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note 8.
82. Id.
83. H.R. 4017, supra note 5.
84. See generally, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
85. See generally, H.R. 4017, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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vating and mitigating factors.9 ' Then, the court must have
concluded that the evidence is accurate and valid and sup-
ports an inference of racial discrimination. 92
If the court found that the defendant produced such
proof, the burden then would have shifted to the government
to provide a non-race based explanation for the sentence.9 3
Prosecutors could meet this burden by showing by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that there is an explanation other
than race bias to explain the death sentence in the particular
case. 9" For example, the prosecutor might meet this burden
by comparing the defendant's crime to other crimes for which
the death penalty was not imposed. Or the prosecutor might
justify the death sentence by pointing to the defendant's prior
record compared to others not sentenced to death. The death
sentence would stand so long as the prosecutor could prove,
by a simple preponderance of the evidence, a non-race based
reason for the sentence.95
This approach to discrimination is hardly new. For ex-
ample, under the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court
has endorsed an almost identical approach to eliminating ra-
cism in jury selection. In Batson v. Kentucky,96 the Supreme
Court held that discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
denies equal protection.97 Under Batson, a defendant must
present a prima facie case of discrimination in striking pro-
spective jurors.98 If such a pattern is demonstrated, the bur-
den then shifts to the prosecution to provide non-race based
reasons for the peremptory challenges. 99
Similarly, under federal civil rights laws, proof of dispa-
rate impact is sufficient to establish a prima facie case and
require that a defendant present a non-race based explana-
tion for the conduct. 100 The Racial Justice Act would apply
this approach to death penalty sentencing.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 93.
99. Id. at 94.
100. See 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VII, supra note 2; 1982 Voting Rights
Act, supra note 42.
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In McCleskey, the Supreme Court expressly declared
that the issue of racism in administering the death penalty
was best dealt with by legislatures and not the judiciary.1"'
The Racial Justice Act responds to this invitation. Congress
has the authority to adopt it pursuant to its powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 2 The Supreme
Court has long recognized that Congress has authority under
this provision to expand protection from government discrim-
ination beyond the Constitution's requirements. 10 3
For instance, in Mobile v. Bolden,104 the Supreme Court
held that proof of discriminatory impact in voting arrange-
ments is not sufficient to demonstrate a violation of equal
protection. 105 In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights
Act specifically to prohibit voting discrimination cases that
are proven by evidence of a disparate impact. 0 6 Likewise, the
Racial Justice Act would use congressional authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 10 7 to prevent racial
discrimination in capital sentencing.10 8
Professor Laurence Tribe has identified three grounds on
which Congress could adopt the Racial Justice Act under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 10 9 First, Congress could enact the
Racial Justice Act to remedy race discrimination against de-
fendants charged with capital crimes." 0 Second, Congress
could enact the Racial Justice Act to remedy race discrimina-
tion against victims of capital crimes."' Third, Congress
could enact the Racial Justice Act to remedy "society's
demeaning vision of blacks as second-class citizens.""12
Opponents of the Racial Justice Act argue that it would
effectively end the administration of capital punishment.
Conservative columnist George Will contends that "[t]he real
101. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
102. See Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitu-
tional Rights, Can Congress Save Us?: An Examination of Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1993).
103. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
104. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
105. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 55 (1980).
106. 1982 Voting Rights Act, supra note 42.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
108. H.R. 4017, supra note 5.
109. 136 CONG. REC. S6891-2 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (reprinting letter from
Professor Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at S6892.
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purpose of the act is to end all executions." 113 But this is no
more true than the contention that allowing statistical proof
of discrimination in employment cases is meant to end all hir-
ing. The Racial Justice Act would allow executions to con-
tinue unless the defendant can prove discrimination, the
court finds the proof to be statistically significant, and the
prosecutor fails to offer sufficient racially neutral explana-
tions for the discriminatory pattern.
The Racial Justice Act would not create a quota in the
administration of the death penalty. Each case would be con-
sidered individually."1  A prosecutor could justify a particu-
lar capital sentence by pointing to factors justifying the pun-
ishment in that case and distinguishing it from others where
the death penalty was not imposed. The Racial Justice Act
simply would apply traditional principles of discrimination to
death penalty decision-making.
V. CONCLUSION
In January 1994, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote:
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared
that the death penalty must be administered fairly, and
with reasonable consistency, or not at all, and despite the
effort of the states courts to devise legal formulas and pro-
cedural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death
penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimina-
tion, caprice, and mistake. 1 5
This caprice is most evident and most unacceptable when
it comes to race and the death penalty. Countless studies
prove that capital punishment is administered in a racially
discriminatory fashion in the United States. Yet, under cur-
rent law, there is no remedy. The Racial Justice Act would
solve the problem, but its passage is now even less likely
with Republicans in control of the House and Senate. It is a
cruel irony that racism is most tolerated in the place where it
should be least allowed: where the government determines
who lives and who dies.
113. George F. Will, Racial Justice Act is Ploy to Kill Death Penalty, CHICAGO
SUN TIMES, May 19, 1994, at 31.
114. H.R. 4017, supra note 5.
115. Callins v. Callins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994).
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